Valerie Fouquet: Fusion |
(T. S. Eliot, 1919, p. 11).
I shall endeavour to address an aspect of what I understand to be 'the
present moment of the past' of psychoanalysis. It is my belief that an
important facet of this 'present moment'
for psychoanalysis is the development of an analytic conceptualisation of the
nature of the interplay of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the
analytic setting and the exploration of the implications for technique that
these conceptual developments hold (p.3)
I believe that it is fair to say that contemporary psychoanalytic
thinking is approaching a point where one can no longer simply speak of the
analyst and the analysand as separate subjects who take one another as objects.
The idea of the analyst as a neutral blank screen for the patient's projections
is occupying a position of steadily diminishing importance in current
conceptions of the analytic process.
My own conception of analytic intersubjectivity places central emphasis
on its dialectical nature. This understanding represents an elaboration and
extension of Winnicott's notion that '"There is no such thing as an
infant" [apart from the maternal provision]'. I believe that, in an analytic context, there is no such
thing as an analysand apart from the relationship with the analyst, and no such
thing as an analyst apart from the relationship with the analysand.
[…] the intersubjectivity of the analyst–analysand coexists in dynamic
tension with the analyst and the analysand as separate individuals with their
own thoughts, feelings, sensations, corporal reality, psychological identity
and so on. Neither the intersubjectivity of the mother–infant nor that of the
analyst–analysand (as separate psychological entities) exists in pure form. The intersubjective and the individually
subjective each create, negate and preserve the other. In both the
relationship of mother and infant and of analyst and analysand, the task is not
to tease apart the elements constituting the relationship in an effort to
determine which qualities belong to each individual participating in it;
rather, from the point of view of the interdependence of subject and object,
the analytic task involves an attempt to describe as fully as possible the
specific nature of the experience of the interplay of individual subjectivity
and intersubjectivity. (p. 4)
I believe that a major dimension of the analyst's psychological life in
the consulting room with the patient takes the form of reverie concerning the
ordinary, everyday details of his own life (that are often of great
narcissistic importance to him). […] these
reveries […] represent symbolic and proto-symbolic (sensation-based) forms
given to the unarticulated (and often not yet felt) experience of the analysand
as they are taking form in the intersubjectivity of the analytic pair (i.e. in
the analytic third). (p.12)
The analytic process reflects the interplay of three subjectivities:
that of the analyst, of the analysand, and of the analytic third. The analytic third is a creation of the
analyst and analysand, and at the same time the analyst and analysand (qua
analyst and analysand) are created by the analytic third (there is no
analyst, no analysand, and no analysis in the absence of the third).
Moreover, the analytic third is an asymmetrical construction because it is generated in the context of the analytic setting, which is powerfully defined by the relationship of roles of analyst and analysand. As a result, the unconscious experience of the analysand is privileged in a specific way, i.e. it is the past and present experience of the analysand that is taken by the analytic pair as the principal (although not exclusive) subject of the analytic discourse. The analyst's experience in and of the analytic third is, primarily, utilised as a vehicle for the understanding of the conscious and unconscious experience of the analysand (the analyst and analysand are not engaged in a democratic process of mutual analysis).
The concept of the analytic third provides a framework of ideas about
the interdependence of subject and object, of transference–countertransference,
that assists the analyst in his efforts to attend closely to, and think clearly
about, the myriad of intersubjective clinical facts he encounters, whether they
be the apparently self-absorbed ramblings of his mind, bodily sensations that
seemingly have nothing to do with the analysand, or any other 'analytic object'
intersubjectively generated by the analytic pair. (p.16-17)
Reference
Ogden, T. H (1994) The Analytic
Third: Working with Intersubjective Clinical Facts. International
Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 75:3-19